

DRAFT

Appendix 1 Additional Warning Signs/Behaviors from Research

The following additional resources may be useful as supplementary information for the threat assessment process. They are not intended to replace any material in the curriculum for threat assessment. However, since the science of threat assessment is young, they may point to evolving standards or protocols for the future and could possibly enhance the considerations and richness of a specific threat assessment and RMS plan.

While the following additional warning signs/behaviors may be partially duplicative of the material in the threat assessment manual, they are presented here in their original form developed by specific authors. Until we have a better understanding of these types of shooters, many authors have formulated their own analysis and packaging of these. In each case, they use a different data set to form their recommended signs/behaviors. By providing their formulations, we hope to enhance your understanding of the factors which possibly impact the prediction of the next generation of school shooters. We still have a lot to learn. Nothing is added here unless it is based on peer reviewed research which is cited.

1. Meloy and Hoffman¹: This research is designed to distinguish dynamic rather than static variables. Acute accelerating risk variables are normally the work of threat assessors who are attempting to manage low frequency, but intentional acts of violence. These behaviors, according to the authors, distinguish between school shooters and other students of concern.

8 Warning Behaviors

1. Pathway warning behaviors. Any behavior which is a part of research, planning, preparation or implementation of an attack
2. Fixation warning behaviors. Any behavior that indicates an increasingly pathological preoccupation with the person or cause.
3. Identification warning behavior. Any behavior that indicates a psychological desire to have warrior mentality closely associated with weapons or other military or law enforcement paraphernalia, identifying previous attacks as desirable
4. Novel aggression warning behavior – An act of violence that appears unrelated to any targeted violence – used as a test of the ability of the subject to engage in violent acts.
5. Energy burst warning behavior. Even if they are relatively innocuous, usually in the days and week preceding the attack
6. Leakage warning behavior. The communication to a third party of an intent to do harm to the target through an attack.
7. Last Resort warning behavior. Evidence of a violent “action imperative” increasing desperation or distress. There is no alternative other than violence and the consequences are justified.

¹ Meloy, Reid and Hoffman, Jens; The Role of Warning Behaviors in Threat Assessment: An Exploration and Suggested Typology,

8. Directly communicated threat warning behavior. Communication of a direct threat to target or LE beforehand. Threat can be written or oral.

2. Secret service guide to warnings²

- Warning Signs Investigators should probe to discover if the subject has engaged in research, planning, or preparation (e.g., researched weapons or made attempts to obtain a weapon). Movement from thought to action represents a severe escalation of the risk of violence.
- In around 80% of school shootings at least one person had information that the attacker was thinking about or planning the school attack. In nearly 66%, more than one person had information about the attack before it occurred. In nearly all of these cases, the person who knew was a peer, a friend, schoolmate, or sibling.
- Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most attacks were stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention.
- Be conscious of the “Werther Effect,” defined as a duplication or copycat of another suicidal act. School shootings are typically well-publicized, sensationalized events that can trigger an increase in similar acts for roughly days or weeks after the attack.

3. Calhoun and Weston: Perspectives on Threat Management.³

This study reviews 25 years of shootings. When dealing with a threat the manager must decide whether the problem individual is either a “hunter” or a “howler”. Howlers “make a lot of noise, they may threaten and otherwise disturb their target. So they must be managed in case some new event moves them to become a hunter. In general, they found that Hunters move from being a howler when :

- feeling a grievance to
- developing the idea that only violence can resolve their injury, to
- researching and planning the attack, to
- making preparations according to dictates of the plan, to
- breaching the targets security and then to
- attack

They suggest to best determine which category an individual represents, they must gather information from the following 20 areas. And “...if enough information is collected from each area, the threat manager can make a fully informed, confident threat assessment about the problem individual.” These appear to be an early version of the Secret Service “11 questions.” They add some richness and delineations to the 11.

² Information compiled from the Safe School Initiative Report, United States Secret Service and Department of Education, (2002); School Violence Threat Management, Dr. Kris Mohandie, (2000); The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective, CIRG/NCAVC, (1999).

³ Calhoun and Weston, Perspectives on Threat Management, Journal of Threat Assessment and Management © 2016 American Psychological Association, 2015, Vol. 2, No. 3-4, 258–267, 2169-4842/15/\$12.00 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/tam0000056>

1. How did the subject choose to approach the target?
2. What about the situation indicates the subject's identity and physical proximity to the target; in other words, who and where is the subject?
3. What about the situation indicates who or what the subject is targeting; in other words, who or what is the target?
4. What about the situation indicates the type of venue being targeted and what is it about the venue that gives insight into the subject's intent, motive, and ability?
5. What about the situation indicates whether or not the Intimacy Effect is in play; in other words, what is the nature of the relationship between the subject and the target?
6. What about the situation relates to the subject's choice of context, including the circumstances and content?
7. Is the target currently accessible to the subject?
8. Does the subject have the ability and motivation to take advantage of any current accessibility to the target?
9. Is there a known history of previous contacts with the target or other targets by this subject?
10. Does the subject have a history of violent or threatening behaviors, including any criminal behavior?
11. What is the subject's knowledge about the target's current situation?
12. Is the subject seeking knowledge about the target and the target's current situation?
13. Does the subject's behavior indicate mental health issues, including suicidality?
14. Does the subject possess, have access to, or give evidence of a fascination with weaponry of any type?
15. Is the subject currently seeking to obtain a weapon?
16. What is the status of the subject's inhibitors, including any recent losses?
17. Has the subject exhibited controlling, isolating, or jealous behaviors toward the target?
18. Does the subject have a history of, or is currently, abusing alcohol, drugs, or prescription medicines?
19. Does the subject have any relevant medical issues?
20. Has the subject engaged in any final act behaviors?

4. "School Shooter, A Threat Assessment Perspective," O'Toole FBI, presents the "4 Pronged Model" of the overall threat assessment process⁴

This model is built on an in-depth review of 18 school shooting cases prior to and including Columbine. Basic findings summary recommended against "checklists", and reminded us of the H.L. Mencken's admonition: "For every complex problem, there is a solution which is simple, neat, and wrong!" They classified threats into direct, indirect, veiled, and conditional as discussed in the main curriculum for this course. They noted that "all threats are not created equal" and that schools who treat all threats as equal, fall into the Abraham Maslow fallacy: "If the only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail." Every threat does not represent the same danger or require the same level of response.

⁴ School Shooter: A threat Assessment Perspective, Critical Incident Response Group, National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia. 2000.

The following lists do not represent checklists. They should only be considered after a threat is made and be used to help build the assessment of the student. No one or two traits or characteristics can be considered alone or given more weight than others. Any student can have a bad day. **As stated “ the key to identifying a potentially dangerous threatener under this four-pronged assessment model is that there is evidence of problems on a majority of the items in each of the four areas.”** Readers are also reminded that many of the behaviors and traits listed below are seen in depressed or narcissistic personality characteristics, which may be separately diagnosed.

1. Personality of the student -

- o “Leakage”
- o Low tolerance for frustration
- o Poor coping skills
- o Lack of resiliency
- o Failed love relationship
- o “injustice collector”
- o Signs of Depression.
- o Narcissism
- o Alienation
- o Dehumanizes others
- o Lack of Empathy
- o Exaggerated sense of Entitlement
- o Attitude of Superiority
- o Exaggerated or pathological need for attention
- o Externalizes blame
- o Masks low self esteem
- o Anger management problems
- o Intolerance
- o Inappropriate humor
- o Seeks to manipulate others
- o Lack of trust
- o Closed social group
- o Rigid and opinionated
- o Unusual interest in sensational violence
- o Fascination with violence-filled entertainment
- o Negative role models
- o Behavior appears relevant to carry out a threat

2. Family Dynamics

- o Turbulent Parent-child relationship
- o Acceptance of pathological behavior
- o Access to weapons
- o Lack of intimacy
- o Student “Rules the Roost”
- o No limits or monitoring of TV and Internet

3. School Dynamics

- o Students attachment to school lacking
- o Tolerance for disrespectful behavior
- o Inequitable discipline
- o Inflexible culture
- o Pecking order among students
- o Code of Silence
- o Unsupervised Computer Access

4. Social Dynamics

- o Easy unmonitored access to movies, tv, games, sites with extreme violence
- o Peer Groups share fascination with violence or extreme beliefs
- o Drugs and Alcohol use
- o Outside interests inappropriate
- o Copycat effect interest

5. U.S. Secret Service Analysis of Targeted School Violence (2019). Attackers Characteristics.

This is a recent in depth study of 41 attackers from 2008-2017. The following is a summary of findings about these shooters. The nice thing about these findings is that they give the threat assessment team a sense of how often specific warning signs/behaviors were present in known shooters. Interesting findings include validation that 80% of shooters felt bullied; that while 61% of the attackers used firearms, 39% of the attacks were perpetrated with a knife, and that of the firearm attacks, 76% got their weapons from family or relatives – 48% of which were not secured; and that 100% experienced “stressors” (social, family, arrests- parents/siblings, family discord, family MH, abuse/neglect and non parental custody) within 6 months of the shooting – 51% within 2 days of shooting. Here are the summary of findings:

- Demographics: (background only)
 - o 78% white or black
 - o 80% were in grades 7 to 11.
- Motives – primary or secondary
 - o Grievances (83%)
 - Peers (63%) of which bullying accounted for 46%
 - Staff (24%)
 - Romantic (22%)
 - Other personal (15%)
 - o Desire to kill (37%)
 - o Suicidal (41%)
 - o Fame (10%)
 - o Psychotic symptoms (12%)
- Planning –
 - o Twenty one (51)% engaged in observable planning behaviors prior to attack
 - o Thirteen (32%) researched weapons prior to attack

- o Nine (22%) engaged in deceptive practices in order to hide activities and avoid detection
- o Seven (17%) engaged in weapons related planning behaviors in addition to weapons research.
- o Seven (17%) documented their plans and intentions thru writing, hit lists, lessons learned from past attacks and diagrams of school
- o Five (12%) researched targets prior to attack, including surveilling the SRO prior to attack.
- o Five (12%) spent time carefully considering how they would execute their attacks
- o Five (12%) conducted research on prior attacks
- o Four (10%) practiced with a weapon prior to attack
- o Four (10%) contemplated or attempted to recruit others to help.
- o Two (5%) packed a supply bag prior to the incident
- o Nine attackers (22%) took unique steps such as stealing money to buy weapons, deleting an e mail account, wearing baggy pants to conceal weapons.
- Firearm Acquisition
 - o For the 41 attacks, firearms accounted for 25 (61%), and knives accounted for 16 (39%).
 - o For the 25 firearm attacks:
 - Nineteen (76%) acquired a firearm from home of a parent or close relative. In twelve of the cases (48%) the firearm was either readily accessible or it was not secured in a meaningful way. But in four of the cases (16%) the firearms were more secure but the attacker was able to gain access by finding keys or guessing pass codes.
 - o Eight of the weapons were acquired on day of attack , five acquired the day before, and four acquired them between two and seven days prior.
 - o 12 of the firearm attackers transported the weapon in a backpack, three in another type bag (guitar case, golf bag, gym bag). One concealed in waist band and two DID NOT conceal weapon.
- Law Enforcement Contact (based on 35 cases- six removed from sample lacking sufficient information in these areas to analyze)
 - o 17 (49%) of the attackers had contact with LE prior to attack. Six (17%) had prior contact with SRO.
- Psychological Behavioral and Developmental Health
 - o 32 (91%) exhibited symptoms of depression, suicidal thoughts, anxiety, anger, and/or psychosis
 - Psychological.
 - Depression 22 (63%)
 - Suicidal thoughts 21 (60%)
 - Anxiety 10 (29%)
 - Anger 9 (26%)
 - Psychosis 7 (20%)
 - Behavioral

- Twenty attackers (57%) displayed behavioral symptoms including defiance, poor impulse control, aggression, anger, animal cruelty. (anger was included here if it occurred in the absence of any identifiable psychological or emotional issue that would account for it)
 - Neurological/Developmental
 - Seven attackers (20%) includes developmental delays, cognitive deficits, learning disabilities and symptoms within the autism spectrum disorders
- Personality Traits. These are evidenced by manner of thinking, feeling, or behaving that falls outside of social norms and causes distress or problems functioning. “One notable feature of attackers in this study...was **narcissism**.” This was manifested in several ways:
 - Inflated sense of self
 - Believing they were superior to others
 - Little concern for rules / law, believing they were above them
 - Little respect for those in authority
 - Some sought fame through violence
 - Lacked empathy
 - Derived sadistic pleasure from the thought of hurting or killing others
 - Callousness – lack of remorse for what they had done
- Mental Health Treatment
 - Of 35 in this study, 19 (54%) received some type of mental health treatment. (but as noted in several other studies, mental health has never been shown to cause violence. Most clients with mental health problems never commit crimes. Skeem (get cite)
- Substance Use and Abuse
 - Seventeen of the attackers (49%) had a history of substance use and/or abuse
- Weapons Use and Violence
 - Three quarters of attackers (27, 77%) had a history of using weapons prior to the attack. These included owning, using, training with, or practicing with weapons. These uses included target practice and hunting.
- History of Violence
 - Eighteen of the attackers (51%) engaged in violent behaviors that did not result in an arrest or contact with law enforcement, including violence toward a family member, physical assaults, threatening or aggressive behavior and hurting animals.

- Interest in Violence and Weapons
 - Seventeen of the attackers (49%) had an unusual or concerning interest in violence or weapon, researched past incidents of mass violence, drew figures of dead students, consumed violent media, wrote journals referencing violent topics, hurt animals or watched video of animals being abused or described themselves as being obsessed with weapons.
- Home Life Factors
 - Thirty three (95%) of the 35 attackers experienced one or more of the following home life factors:
 - Parents separated/divorced (71%)
 - Family financial difficulty (69%)
 - Parents or siblings arrested/incarcerated (54%)
 - Parents or sibling's substance abuse (46%)
 - Family discord (including domestic violence/abuse) (40%)
 - Family Mental Health (23%)
 - Abuse/neglect suffered by the attacker (23%)
 - Nonparental custody/care (11%)
- Stressors
 - All 35 attackers (100%) experienced stressors, with nearly all (33, 94%) experiencing at least one in the six months prior to their attack. Twenty six (74%) experienced a stressor within one month of the attack, and Eighteen of the attackers (51%) experienced a stressor within **Two Days** of the attack.
 - Social (35) – bullying, peer conflicts, romantic breakup
 - Family (35) – conflicts home, abuse, neglect
 - Academic/Disciplinary (31) – grades/suspensions
 - General Personal (22) -failed drug test, homelessness, physical appearance worries
 - Changing Schools (19)- not including normal transitions
 - Criminal/Judicial (10) – system contact
 - Physical Health (9) -
 - Employment (6)
- Bullying
 - **Twenty eight (80%)** were bullied by classmates. Bullying included physical, social, property, or cyber

6. Comparison of Averted and Completed School Attacks, The Police Foundation. Characteristics of perpetrators of averted school attacks and completed school attacks.

Major findings:

No averted attacks (out of 41 studied) occurred when the student characteristics included:

- Disregard for authority/rules;
- Does not take responsibility for consequences

- Lacking empathy, guilt or remorse
- Extreme narcissism.

Some Averted attacks did occur with the following characteristics, but in most cases, 70% or more, when one of these characteristics appeared in both data sets, the attack was completed:

7. Rampage⁵ criteria is the most parsimonious set of warning signs in existence today.

Based in large part on the findings detailed, Newman offers a five- part model of **necessary** but not **sufficient** conditions for rampage school shootings, noting that her "approach is useful because although it is parsimonious, it combines elements at the individual, community and national levels, providing a more realistic understanding of how each one contributes to these explosions of rage." The five factors are these:

1. the shooter's perception of himself as marginal in the social worlds that matter to him,
2. psychosocial mental health problems that "magnify the impact of marginality,
3. the availability of cultural scripts that proffer violence as potential solution to the shooter's dilemma, (see the "grievance culture"⁶)
4. the failure of surveillance systems to collect common data about the shooter, and
5. gun availability.

Overall her study included 85 cases from the CDC, Secret Service, and a National Academy of Sciences set of cases.

There is nothing new in Newman's model, since each of the factors she identifies has been observed by other scholars and commentators. Rather, the novelty of her approach is her insistence that each of these factors is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for a school shooting. Adopting this analytical position demands that Newman place a significant amount of emphasis on the organizational structures and conditions under which all of these factors converge and eventuate in a rampage shooting, which is precisely what she does in the book's most lucid moments.

Finally in a foreign study of the Newman 5 criteria, applied to 14 school shootings in seven countries the "theory is found to be generally valid even in contexts where socio-cultural conditions and shooters modus operandi differ notably from those in its original focus."⁷

- Depressed mood 5 averted, out of 23 (i.e. out of 82 cases when depressed mood was indicated, only 5 were in the averted data set).
- Impaired social emotional functioning 4 out of 1 averted cases

⁵ Schoenfeld, Alan, Yale Law and Policy Review, Vol 23:347, 2005.

⁶ Levin, Jack, Madfis, Eric; Mass Murder at School and Cumulative Strain; American Behavioral Scientist, Volume 52, Number 9, May 2009, 1227-1245. "the acute strain initiates a planning stage "wherein a mass killing is fantasized about as a masculine solution to regain lost feelings of control, and actions are taken to ensure the fantasy can become a reality"

⁷ Lindgren, Sven-Ake & Charlotta Thodelius, School Shootings in Seven Countries: Testing and Developing the Theory of Five Necessary Conditions.

Appendix 2: VALIDATED THREAT ASSESSMENTS AND PROFILES.

Validated Threat Assessments are rare, but may be very useful in the assessment of threat. Validation always presents some outcomes and then tests the tool against that tool. In essence, they are a summation of various warning signs which have been proven to effect outcomes measured.

Threat assessments come on many varieties and have differing levels of proof of effectiveness. The one we are testing here has not been proven. Neither has any other threat assessment in most jurisdictions. We often refer to proven assessments as having been “validated.” Validation means we have looked at the outcomes which occur, and in fact the tool predicts them. The problem with predicting shootings is that they have a low base rate – ie. They do not happen very often. So every tool can be said to be proven! Eg. if we predict, using any tool, that someone will not shoot, we will be correct most of the time! Because it rarely happens. While this might make us feel successful, we must look to other possible outcomes to more completely feel confident about using a threat assessment instrument. For example, did it increase suspensions? did it increase help seeking? did it increase anonymous reporting? did it increase racial profiling? did it reduce reported bullying? did it increase counseling services? did it reduce peer victimization? etc.

A common misperception of threat assessment is that if it doesn’t predict who will be violent, it is not successful. But the public health approach to violence reduction can address the “risk factors” for violence in general and be successful. For example, we know that family violence, antisocial peer groups, and bullying are proven risk factors for violence. We can generally work on reducing those risk factors and reduce violence in general. So too threat assessments, as presented here, can prevent violence by carefully assessing risk and then helping individuals resolve problems and conflicts that stimulate threatening behavior.

1. Comprehensive School Threat Assessment Guidelines (CSTAG)⁸.

CSTAG models a five step process for threat assessment. It is the successor to the VStag model first introduced by Dr. Cornell. It contains steps similar to the model we have developed for implementation here. The difference is that this model has extensive research on outcomes associated with school risk factors. The following are the 5 controlled studies they have completed.

Study 1 compared 95 HS using CSTAG, 131 Schools using locally developed procedures for threat assessment and 54 schools reporting no use of a threat assessment approach. Cornell found there was less bullying, greater willingness to seek help for bullying and threats of violence and more positive perceptions of school staff members than in schools **not** using this model.

⁸ Cornell, Dewey G. Threat Assessment as a school violence prevention strategy, *Criminology and Public Policy*; 2020; 19:235-252.

Study 2 compared 23 HS using CSTAG with 26 control group HS schools not using the model. The CSTAG schools had a 50% reduction in long term suspensions and a 79% reduction in bullying infractions.

Study 3 compared 20 randomly assigned schools receiving CSTAG with 20 schools not receiving the training (delayed one year). CSTAG school students were four times more likely to receive counseling services and two and a half times more likely to receive a parent conference than those untrained schools. Students in the intervention group (CSTAG) were approximately one third as likely to receive a long term suspension and one eighth as likely to be transferred to a different school.

Study 4 examined suspension rates in secondary schools that had adopted CSTAG across the state of Virginia. Among 663 secondary schools, the 398 schools using CSTAG recorded 15% fewer short term suspensions and 25% less long term suspensions as well as lower levels of peer victimization as reported by students than those not trained in CSTAG.

Study 5 examined long term suspension rates, peer victimization reported by students, fair discipline, and higher teacher perceptions of school safety. In examining 166 middle schools, 47 schools using CSTAG and 119 schools using no threat assessment approach, found the schools using CSTAG had lower suspension rates, lower peer victimization, fair discipline, and higher teacher perceptions of school safety.

2. Savry – A validated risk tool. Predicts future violence. Not validated for psychopathic nor psychotic traits⁹.

The SAVRY is divided into 24 risk factors (rated low, moderate, or high) and six protective factors (rated present or absent). The risk factor groupings are: Historical (including such items as history of violent and non-violent offending, early initiation of violence, past supervision/intervention failures and poor school achievement), Social/Contextual (including, for example, peer delinquency, peer rejection and poor parental management), and Individual (for instance, negative attitudes, risk-taking/impulsivity, substance use difficulties, psychopathic traits, and low interest/commitment to school). In a separate section the SAVRY considers protective factors, such as prosocial involvement, strong social support, strong attachments and bonds (to positive figures) and a strong commitment to school.

The manual reports two validity studies of the SAVRY, both of which support its positive relationship with future serious delinquent acts. Additionally, the results of two unpublished studies available from the senior author also support the SAVRY's positive relationship to risk, with the overall clinical judgment being the best predictor, Individual/Clinical and Historical factors being good predictors, and the Protective factors being a mildly positive predictor.

Use of the SAVRY has another notable benefit for the forensic evaluator: clear articulation in the report of the factors involved in determining risk. All too often—although perhaps more in the past than now—forensic evaluators would make conclusory statements in

⁹ Borum, R. cite needed -- In the more recent research by Langman, and in an item review of the Savry with the LSI-R, it appears that Savry will predict the "Traumatized" shooter, but not the psychotic or Psychotic shooter.

reports without laying a systematic foundation. Use of the SAVRY, and systematic description of each factor score, prevents such bad form

3. . **Langman Typology of Shooters,**

The assessor is reminded that these topologies of shooters can be misused to label innocent students, and that the label itself does not imply violence! Most traumatized kids do not commit violent crimes, most psychopaths do not commit violent crimes (20% are corporate CEO's!), and most psychotic children do not commit violent crimes. The use of this topology is discouraged in any setting other than possibly the development of a plan for response, management and support – which when taking these psychological traits into account may better help in the development of the plan.

A number of researchers have sought to identify the features that school shooters have in common in terms of family life, personalities, histories, and behaviors. This original article examines the cases of 10 rampage school-shooters in an effort to find out not only how they are **alike**, but also how they **differ**. Based on available information, these youths are categorized into three types: traumatized, psychotic, and psychopathic. Out of the 10 shooters discussed, three were traumatized, five were psychotic, and two were psychopathic.

- The three traumatized shooters all came from broken homes with parental substance abuse and parental criminal behavior. They all were physically abused and two were sexually abused outside of the home.
- The five psychotic shooters had schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, including schizophrenia and schizotypal personality disorder. They all came from intact families with no history of abuse.
- The two psychopathic shooters were neither abused nor psychotic. They demonstrated narcissism, a lack of empathy, a lack of conscience, and sadistic behavior. Most people who are traumatized, psychotic, and psychopathic do not commit murder.

Beyond identifying the three types of rampage shooters, additional factors are explored that may have contributed to the attacks. These include family structure, role models, and peer influence.

More recent research includes 48 shooters, 42% who were traumatized, 29% were psychopathic, and 29% were psychotic.

Psychopathy should be diagnosed by a clinical psychologist. And it is not any one or a few of these traits which may indicate psychopathy, rather it is a constellation of these traits that tends to suggest psychopathy. Psychopathy traits summarized are from the Hare: Psychopathy Check List – Youth Version are as follows:

- Interpersonal
 - a. Impression management
 - b. Glibness/superficial charm
 - c. Pathological lying
 - d. Manipulation for personal gain
- Affective
 - a. Lack of Remorse
 - b. Shallow affect
 - c. Callous/lack of empathy
 - d. Failure to accept responsibility
- Behavioral
 - a. Stimulation-seeking
 - b. Parasitic orientation
 - c. Lack of goals
 - d. Impulsivity
 - e. Irresponsibility
- Antisocial
 - a. Poor anger control
 - b. Early behavior problems
 - c. Serious criminal behavior
 - d. Serious violations of conditions
 - e. Criminal versatility

An interesting study: A 2012 study of 77 13-18 year old adolescents who threatened mass shootings in Finland, after the tragic shootings in November 07 and September 08, analysis showed that the 77 copycat threats were characterized with a high prevalence of mental and behavioral disorders. Like actual shooters, they showed psychotic symptoms and traumatic experiences, but unlike the shooters, the copycats were not psychopathic!

4. Risk and Resiliency Check Up. (Justice System Assessment and Training¹⁰) This is the only validated risk and protective factor validated tool currently in use. This tool listed develops both a “risk” score for the student, and also a “protective” score. It assesses both “risk” and “protective” factors. A score for each is developed. When the protective score is subtracted from the risk score, a final resiliency score is produced. In a Rand Corporation study of this tool’s use with juvenile delinquent populations in San Diego, they found the resiliency score to be predictive of general delinquent behavior as well as violent behavior. This tool is in the public domain and is currently being considered for use by Denver Juvenile diversion authorities. It has

¹⁰ Rand Corporation , Turner, S; Fain, T, and Sehgal, A. Validation of Risk and Resiliency Assessment Tool for Juveniles in the Los Angeles County Probation System, 2005

been trained and used by some SRO's. But it is more time consuming than other assessment tools. However, a screening version with only 7 questions may be used to limit the time it takes to complete the tool. Those scoring low resiliency, were rearrested 40%-50% whereas those scoring high on resiliency, were only rearrested 10-20% of the time. High resiliency juveniles were arrested for a violent offense 2%-4% of the time, whereas those with low resiliency were rearrested for a violent offense 10%-12% of the time.

Risk and Protective factors assessed: (each scale has three levels of presence)

1. Delinquency:
 - a. Risk Factors: arrests, offenses under the influence, assaultive behavior, rewards for delinquent behavior
 - b. Protective Factors :Neighborhood support, pro social non parent adult relationships, Interactions with teachers, Educational aspirations, caring/supportive school climate
2. Education:
 - a. Risk Factors: Poor academic achievement, pattern of truancy, pattern of suspensions, disruptive school grounds behavior, presently not in education program
 - b. Protective Factors:School engagement/bonds, attachment with academic achiever, interactions with teachers, education aspirational goals, caring/supportive school climate
3. Family:
 - a. Risk Factors: Poor relationships with caregivers, Caretaker rules/supervision deficiencies, Chaotic family interactions, Caretaker criminality/AOD/Abuse, Runaway
 - b. Protective Factors:Communicates with family, constructive home activities, prosocial family activities, family support, unconditional regard from caregiver.
4. Peer:
 - a. Risk Factors: Rejected by peers, very few prosocial acquaintances, gang affiliation, has delinquent friends, no meaningful relationship with prosocial adult.
 - b. Protective Factors: Prosocial peer relationships, has positive confidant, values dignity and rights of others, ability to make prosocial friends, ability to communicate disagreements.
5. Substance Use
 - a. Risk Factors: Pattern of substance abuse, used mood altering substances, uses alcohol/substances frequently, substances interferes with daily functioning, early onset of substance use.
 - b. Protective factors: Caretaker models healthy moderation, effectively manages peer pressure, youth free of distressing habits, youth manages stress well, positive self concept.
6. Individual
 - a. Risk Factors: No prosocial interests, supportive of delinquency, anger management issues, thrill seeking, manipulative/deceitful.

- b. Protective Factors: Values honest/integrity, Self control, self efficacy in prosocial roles, consequential thinking skills, sets and completes prosocial goals